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STATEMENT ON JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken from a divorce decree entered in the Third Judicial District
Court, State of Utah, by the Honorable Terry Christiansen. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: 1.

Whether the District Court erred in its failure to find that the Appellant

("Mr. Romero") had a second mortgage on the condominium located at 416 East
Creekside Circle # B, Murray, Utah 84107, which should have been used along with the
Court's other findings regarding marital property, mortgages and remaining equity to
calculate the parties' marital assets and debts and reach an equitable division of those
marital assets.
Standard of Review of Issue 1. The court should "defer to a trial court's factual
findings unless there is clear error but review its legal conclusions for correctness.
Richard v. Brown, 2009 WL 3463363, citing Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1241 (Utah
1998). If a trial court's findings are incomplete, this Court may "order the trial court . . .
to supplement, modify, or complete the findings to make them conform to the issues
presented and the facts as found from the evidence and may direct the trial court ... to
enter judgment in accordance with the findings as revised. Utah R. App. P. 30(a);
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11,ffif15-23, 176 P.3d 476, 481-84; Anderson
v. Thompson, Not Reported in P.3d, 2008 WL 2058253 (Utah Ct. App. 2008).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE
APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1) (2009).
Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children — Division
of debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time —
Determination of alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties.
Utah R. App. Proc. 3(a). See Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE.
This case was tried before Judge Christensen on January 23, 2009, R. 309-310.
Mr. Romero appeals the Third District Court's March 24, 2009, divorce decree denying
Mr. Romero any equity interest in the parties' marital property located at 786 River
Glenn Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah as inequitable because the District Court failed to
include in its Decision and Findings of Facts a material debt. R. 342-343.
Specifically, Mr. Romero appeals the Court's failure to find that Mr. Romero had
a second mortgage on the condominium located at 416 East Creekside Circle # B,
Murray, Utah 84107, which finding should have been used, along with the Court's other
findings regarding marital property, mortgages and remaining equity, to calculate the
parties' marital assets and debts and reach an equitable division of those marital assets.
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B. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Mr. Romero and Appellee, ("Mrs. Romero") were married in May
2004. Prior to their marriage, Mrs. Romero owned a home located at 786 River Glen
Drive, in Murray, Utah, and Mr. Romero owned a condominium located at 416 East
Creekside # B in Murray, Utah. R. 318-319.
At the time of the parties' marriage in May 2004, there was no equity existing in
either Mr. Romero's condominium or Mrs. Romero's home. R. 319. In August 2004, Mr.
Romero's name was added to the title of Mrs. Romero's home and in May 2006, a second
mortgage in the amount of $31,000.00 was taken out on the home to replace a prior
second mortgage existing on the home. R. 319. In January 2007 the parties separated and
both filed for divorce. R. 1-4, 11-13, 320. This case was tried before Judge Christensen
on January 23, 2009, R. 309-310.
The Court found that the River Glen property was a marital asset with $67,000.00
equity in the property.

R. 379 p. 201.

Although the court did not consider the

condominium to be a martial asset, the Court found it fair to consider the $46,000.00
equity in Mr. Romero's condominium in the division of the marital assets. R. 379 p. 202.
Further, the court found the difference in equities of the property to be about $20,000.00.
R. 379 p. 202.
In valuing the property, the District Court found that the fair market value of Mrs.
Romero's home, as of the date of separation, was $235,000.00 and that the fair market
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value of Mr. Romero's was $122,000.00. R. 320. The District Court found that the debt
owing on Mrs. Romero's home was $168,000.00, representing $31,000.00 on a second
mortgage and $137,000.00 on a first mortgage. R. 320. The court also found the debt
owing on Mr. Romero's condominium was $76,000.00 but the court failed to include in
its calculation the second mortgage that existed on the condominium. R. 320, 379 pp
206-07.
At two different times during the trial Mr. Romero testified that the debt on his
condominium included an $85,000.00 first mortgage and an approximately $23,000.00
second mortgage. Mr. Romero testified to the first and second mortgage while being
examined by Mrs. Romero's attorney and again on direct examination by Mr. Romero's
attorney.

R. 379 at pp. I l l , 123-24.

Specifically, Mr. Romero testified that his

remaining mortgage balance at the time of trial was approximately $76,000.00 but that he
had acquired a second mortgage in November 2003 for an additional $23,000.00. R. 379
pp. 109-11, 123-24. Additionally, Mr. Romero filed with the District Court a financial
declaration noting that the debt owing on the condominium consisted of both a first
mortgage, with an approximate value of $75,000.00, and a second mortgage, with an
approximate value of $28,000.00. R. 74-79.
In its Ruling and Findings of Facts, the District Court methodically calculated the
equity of Mrs. Romero's home, identifying and valuing both the first and second
mortgage in its calculation. R. 320. However, when calculating Mr. Romero's equity in
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his condominium, the District Court identified and valued the first mortgage but failed to
identify and value the second mortgage. R. 320. Mr. Romero's attorney brought this
error to the District Court's attention by reiterating Appellant's testimony that there was
both a first and second mortgage on the condominium and that the balance of $76,000.00
represented only the first mortgage. R. 379 pp. 206-08. Mr. Romero's attorney also
offered to file a motion to amend the record to clarify this fact. R. 379 p. 207. The
District Court indicated it was unwilling to change its findings, stating that the division
was "really about the same for each side" and that a subsequent motion to clarify the
record "won't make any difference." R. 379 p. 207.
In its findings regarding the division of property, the court found that the
condominium was Mr. Romero's separate property and that, while the home was,
originally the separate property of Mrs. Romero, it became marital property. R. 320. The
District Court then used its equitable power to deviate from the general presumption that
marital property be divided equally among the parties and concluded that since there was
only an "insignificant" $20,000.00 difference in equity between the condominium and the
home that the Mrs. Romero should be awarded all rights, title, and interest in the home
and Mr. Romero should be awarded all rights and interests in the condominium. R. 321.
On April 21, 2009 Mr. Romero filed a motion for appeal. R. 342-343.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Since the District Court failed to include in its calculation, Mr. Romero's
$23,000.00 second mortgage, the difference in equity between the properties was not
$21,000.00 but was actually $44,000.00, representing a difference between the equity in
the home of $67,000.00 (FMV $235,000.00 - (1 st mortgage of 137,000+ 2nd mortgage of
$31,000.00)) and of the condominium of $23,000.00 (FMV $122,000.00 - (1 st mortgage
of $76,000.00 + 2nd mortgage of $23,000.00).
The District Court's failure to identify and value the second mortgage on the
condominium in its Decision or Findings of Fact is a reversible error. By not identifying
the second mortgage in its distribution or explaining the reasoning behind this omission,
the appeals court cannot effectively review whether the omission of the second mortgage
resulted in a fair and equitable distribution of the party's marital property. Therefore, this
court should order the District Court to supplement its findings of fact to include the
second mortgage and to reconsider the distribution of assets based on the supplemented
findings.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INCLUDE IN ITS
FINDINGS MR. ROMERO'S SECOND MORTGAGE ON HIS
CONDOMINIUM.
Failure to identify and value all items of marital property and debt is a reversible

error for which an appellate court should order the trial court to supplement its findings
and reconsider the distribution of the marital property based upon those findings. Stevens
v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 955-56 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); see also Stonehocker v.
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ffif 15-23, 176 P.3d 476, 481-84 (finding that it was
reversible error for the trial court not to assign values for all material marital property);
Potter v. Potter, 845 P.2d 272, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (finding that "the trial court's
property distribution must be based on findings which place a dollar value on the
distributed assets and liabilities").
In Stevens v. Stevens, this court found that failure to "identify the items of marital
property and debt" and "assign values to each item of . . . debt" was a reversible error.
Stevens, 754 P.2d at 955-56. In the Stevens case, the marital property consisted of several
pieces of property all of which was heavily indebted and for which controversy existed
over the amount of indebtedness each party should be responsible for. Id. Despite this
controversy, the trial court failed to identify and value the large debt in its decision. Id.
The appellate court reversed and remanded the trial court's decision because without a
more precise statement of the parties' assets and liabilities it was unable to "perform [its]
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reviewing

function

and determine whether the parties' property was

equitably

distributed." Id.
Like the trial court in Stevens, the Third District Court committed reversible error
by not identifying and valuing all items of material,

debt and should be ordered to

supplement its findings. In its Decision, the Third District Court failed to identify a
material item of debt of $23,000.00 and failed to provide an explanation for its omission.
As a result of this omission, when the District Court awarded the condominium to Mr.
Romero and the home to Mrs. Romero, the relative value of Mr. Romero's marital
property was overstated by approximately $23,000.00. Without a more precise statement
for the District Court's reasoning for this omission, the appellate court cannot detemiine
whether the distribution of marital assets was equitable.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Divorce Decree entered on March 24, 2009, by
the Third District Court should be reversed. Appellant respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the Third District Court's order and remand the case.
DATED this

day of November 2009.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

*atricia L. LafenppE
Attorney for
Respondent/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 7

day of November 2009, I did cause a tme and

correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be mailed, United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Richard S. Nemelka
Nemelka & Nemelka
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
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ADDENDUM
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from a
district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all
final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of
appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an
appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect
the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to appeal from a
judgment or order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may
file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of another party after filing separate
timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single
appellant. Individual appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its
own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the separate
appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the appellant
and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be
changed in consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the appellate
court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original
application shall be known as the petitioner and any other party as the respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties
taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from;
shall designate the court from which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the court to
which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice of the
filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of
record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not represented by
counsel, then on the party at the party's last known address. A certificate evidencing such
service shall be filed with the notice of appeal. If counsel of record is served, the
certificate of service shall designate the name of the party represented by that counsel.
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or
cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial
court the filing fee established by law. The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice
of appeal regardless of whether the filing fee has been paid. Failure to pay the filing fee
within a reasonable time may result in dismissal.

4823-5463-4244

10

(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial
court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date
of its filing, and a statement by the clerk indicating whether the filing fee was paid and
whether the cost bond required by Rule 6 was filed. Upon receipt of the copy of the
notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket.
An appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the
appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant,
such name shall be added to the title.
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1

that you were addicted to porn, correct?

2

A

Why would I?

3

Q

Okay.

4

A

If I wasn't.

5

Q

Right.

And you - when you and her went to

6

counseling, you knew when she brought all of this up that she

7

felt that you were addicted to pornography?

8

A

That was her statement, yes.

9

Q

Okay.

10

A

I still, yes.

11

Q

And didn't she tell you at that time in ^06 that she

12

And you still denied it at that time?

just found all of this information on the computer?

13

A

She stated that she made that statement, yes.

14

Q

Okay.

16

A

She stated that to the counselor.

17

Q

Okay.

15

18

it?

And so she agreed to go to counseling with you

to work on your problem with pornography?

19

A

No.

20

Q

Okay.

21

And she was obviously really concerned about

That was not the reason for going to counseling.
Do you know what the current mortgage balance

is on your condominium?

22

A

As of today?

23

Q

Yeah.

24

A

It's approximately $115,000, I believe.

25

Q

$115,000?

How much was it when you were married?
1091

1

THE COURT:

Is that the balance owing or -

2

MR. NEMELKA:

Yeah.

3

THE WITNESS:

Oh.

The balance owing.

4

Q

(BY MR. NEMELKA)

Your balance owing is $115,000?

5

A

Oh, the balance.

No.

6

Q

To date.

7

A

I'm sorry.

8

Q

Okay.

9

A

Currently?

10

Q

Yes.

11 |

A

Oh, the balance on the condo right now is

12

approximately $76,000.

No.

I believe it is.

13 I

Q

$76,000?

14

A

$76,000, correct.

15

Q

And what's the value?

16

A

Approximately $121,000.

17

Q

But you had an appraisal done on it, right?

18

A

Right.

19

Q

What did the appraisal say?

20

A

I believe it was $121,000, but -

21

Q

Okay.

22

A

23

Q

24
25

I'm not a hundred percent sure.
Okay.

And do you know what the balance was at the

time you got married?
A

The balance of the just the mortgage payment?
110

1

Q

Right.

2

A

I want to say at the time I got married, it had to

3

have been about $183,000 - 84,000, I believe.

4

Q

$183,000?

5

A

I mean, I'm sorry.

6

Q

$83,000?

7

A

$84,000, approximately.

8

Q

Okay, all right.

9

Eighty -

And do you have a second mortgage

on the condo?

10

A

I do.

11

Q

Pardon?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

And when did you take out the second mortgage?

14

A

I took it - I took one out in November of A03 for an

15

amount of $23,500.

16

Q

That was before you got married?

17

A

Correct.

18

Q

Okay.

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

When did you do that?

22

A

About February of 2007.

23

Q

Seven?

24

A

Correct.

25

Q

That was after you separated from -

19

But after you got married, did you take any

more?
I took out another $5,000.

1

where were you living?

2

A

At the condominium.

3

Q

At the time you purchased it?

4

A

Yes.

5

Oh, I'm sorry.

At the time I purchased the

condominium?

6

Q

Yes.

7

A

Yeah.

8

Q

I think you testified that you purchased the

I was living in -

9 I condominium in October of '03?
10

A

Right.

11

Q

And -

12

A

Oh, yes, yes.

I'm sorry.

I was living at River Glen

13

at the time.

14

Q

You were living with Ms. Romero?

15

A

Correct.

16

Q

And did - was she aware that you were buying the

17

condo?

18

A

She was.

19

Q

Now, did you take out a second mortgage on the condo?

20

A

I did.

21

Q

And when did you take out that second mortgage?

22

A

November of 2003.

23

Q

How much equity was in the condo after you took out

24
25 I

I'm sorry, yes.

the second mortgage?
A

I want to say approximately - I'm sorry.

Repeat the
123

1

question.

2 I

Q
second

3

So you purchased the property and you took out a
mortgage in November of *03.

4

A

Correct.

5

Q

I'm asking you after you took out that second

6

mortgage, how much equity was in the condominium?

7

A

Oh, approximately $23,000, I believe it was.

8 j

Q

After you took out the second mortgage?

A

Okay.

Q

How much was your second mortgage for?

12 I

A

$23,000.

13 |

Q

And you took that out in November of

A

Correct.

15 I

Q

So now you have a first mortgage of about $85,000?

16 j

A

Yes.

17 I

Q

Yes.

Let me go

9 j back.
10 j
i

11 ,
i

A

03?

i
14 !
i

18

And you have a second mortgage of approximately

$23,000?

19

A

Correct.

20

Q

So after that - those two mortgages, how much equity

21

was in the condominium?

22

A

Oh, it was approx - probably zero.

23

Q

And how do you know that?

24

A

We checked, cause I maxed it out.

25

Q

You wanted to borrow as much as you could 12

1

presented, is about $168,000 - $31,000 on the second mortgage,

2

and $137,000 on the first.

3

condominium was about $76,000.

4

The testimony as to the debt on the

The Court has to make a determination based upon the

5

case law cited as to the identity of the property in dispute to

6

determine whether each item is a marital or separate property.

7

The Court finds that nothing was done as it relates to the

8

condominium to make it a marital asset.

9

Romero's sole name.

10
11

on it.

It was kept in Mr.

He's the only one that made any payments

He took all control and management over that.
I do find that the home was originally a separate

12

asset of Mrs. Romero.

13

number of reasons, the first of which is that - is Mr. Romero's

14

name was placed on the property.

15

and improvements to the property, and he made half of the

16

mortgage payment for that property, and it was never considered

17

by him as a rental payment.

18

It then became a marital asset for a

He made a number of repairs

The Court next must consider whether there are

19

exceptional circumstances that are from the general presumption

20

that marital property be divided equally between the parties,

21

and I find that there are those circumstances, and I will cite

22

those as follows:

23

testimony of both Mrs. Romero and Mr. Romero that both

24

properties would be put in both names.

25

then there would have been a claim of title based upon deeds to

Number one, it was the clear intent from the

And had that been done,

201

1

each property.

2

Furthermore, I find it inherently unfair that Mr.

3

Romero can receive $650 per month rent from his condominium,

4

put it into his separate bank account, and not get any income

5

from the home.

6

similarly.

7

condominium, put it into his own account.

8

the equity in that property, and had a third party basically

It seems to me they should be treated

And what he did is he took the rent on the

9 I pay his mortgage payment.

So he obtained all

Certainly, Mrs. Romero could have

10

done the same thing had they moved into the condominium.

11

don't think would be fair to Mr. Romero if that property was

12

leased to someone that she knew, or even just a tenant off the

13

street, and then she kept all that money.

14 J

I

It seems to me this is fairly a novel case, because

15

both parties come into this marriage, which is rather short in

16

duration, with an asset with no equity.

17

different.

18

$67,000 equity in the home as of the date of separation.

19

$46,000 equity in the condominium.

20

approximately.

21

The values are not way

There's, according to the Court calculations -

That's about $20,000

There's not that much difference.

I do think, however, that there should be

22

reimbursement for some of the repairs and improvements made on

23

the property.

24

was installed at $500, but I think that is offset by the fact

25

that there's $1,200 needed to repair the walls as a result of

Some there should not be.

The picture window
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1

Mrs. Romero said he did not.

2

the evidence who's correct and who isn't.

3

dispute, and I'm just not in a position that I can say who is

4

accurate and who isn't.

5

relates to reimbursement of those funds.

6

All right.

I just - I can't determine from

So the burden hasn't been met as it

I addressed the division of real

7

property.

8

for annulment and attorney's fees.

9

addressed?

10

There's $450 in

I addressed reimbursement of marital funds, grounds

MS. LATULIPPE:

Anything the Court has not

The only question I have, Your Honor

11 J - and if the Court would like, I can file a motion - a
12

subsequent motion, but I believe the testimony on the mortgage

13

on the condo was that there was a first mortgage for $83,000

14

and a second mortgage for $22,000.

15

$73,000 on the mortgage, I believe that's - or $76,000 debt on

16

the condo, I believe that's just on the first mortgage.

17
18

MR. NEMELKA:

But there's also testimony that my

client knew nothing about the second mortgage.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. NEMELKA:

21

THE COURT:

22

And so the number of

Yeah.

He testified -

He took it out.
He testified that there was $76,000

balance on the condo, and the value was $121,000.

23

MR. NEMELKA:

Right.

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. LATULIPPE:

That was my - what I wrote down.
But I think there was a clarification
2061

1

right after that, Your Honor, that it was - that's what he

2

thinks the value on the first mortgage was, but he testified

3

that the month after he bought the condo in November, 2003, he

4

took out another mortgage on the property for approximately -

5

THE COURT:

Yeah, but I'm not looking at the 2003

6

value.

7

that there was $76,000 owing on the condominium, and he

8

estimated the value at a $121,000.

9
10 I

I'm looking at the 2007 value, and his testimony was

MR. NEMELKA:
MS. LATULIPPE:

That's correct.
But when - I think his testimony was,

11

and I can go through the record, but I think his testimony was

12

that he's continued to maintain the second mortgage as well.

13

There are two mortgages on the condo just like there are two

14

mortgages on the River Glen property.

15

THE COURT:

I thought it was ironic that both second

16

mortgages were used to pay off individual debts from the

17

individual parties.

18

each side and -

19
20

I mean, so it's really about the same for

MS. LATULIPPE:
file a motion, I will.

But my - and I - if you want me to
But if we can deal it with it here -

21

THE COURT:

It won't make any difference.

22

MS. LATULIPPE:

Because my concern is, in looking at

23

the River Glen property, you took into consideration the first

24

and the second mortgage.

25

condominium, you only took into consideration the first

But when you looked at the
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1

mortgage, not the second mortgage when you were calculating the

2

value. And both of those mortgages are still on the property,

3

THE COURT:

Well, I base my decision on the testimony

4

that was presented, and that was the testimony that I heard

5

from your client.

6

right.

So that's where I'm taking it from.

All

Mr. Nemelka, I'll have you prepare the findings of

7 I facts and conclusions of law in the decree of divorce,
MR. NEMELKA:

Thank you, Your Honor.

In regard to

9 I getting a copy of your ruling, do we do that through that here?
10
11

THE COURT:
exhibits.

ROY:

13

THE COURT:

I will.
Does counsel want the courtesy copies

back?

15

MR. NEMELKA:

16

THE COURT:

17

MS. LATULIPPE:

18

THE COURT:

19
20 J

I do need those

I've got - Roy, do you want to get those for me?

12

14

Just talk to my clerk.

file.

All right.

No,
Or throw them away?
I don't, Your Honor.

Okay.

I've just got the originals in the

Court's in recess,

(Whereupon the trial was concluded)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

ALICE M. ROMERO,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL ROMERO,
Respondent.

Case No.074400280
Judge : CHRISTIANSEN

The trial in the above matter came on before the Court on the 23rd of January 2009 before the
Honorable Terry Christiansen, Petitioner being present and represented by Richard S. Nemeika and
Respondent being present and represented by Patricia LaTulippe and witness having been sworn and
testified and exhibits having been admitted and the court having reviewed the same and the parties
having previously stipulated to the resolution of all but four issues and good cause appearing
therefore, the Court hereby finds as follows:

A A O O - - 1 -J

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That Petitioner is a bona fide resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and has

been for more than three (3) months pnor to the commencement of this action
2.

That Petitioner and Respondent were married on the 1st day of May, 2004, in Las

Vegas, State of Nevada, and now are and ever since have been husband and wife
3.

Petitioner testified that pnor to the marriage the Respondent failed to disclose

information to her in regard to his financial honesty and his involvement with another woman and
pornography The Respondent testified and the Petitioner acknowledged that she went to a swingers
bar with him pnor to getting married and also knew about the affair with another woman. The Court
finds that the Petitioner failed to meet her burden to establish fraud going to the essence of the
marriage and of such a degree that it defeated the essential purpose of the injured spouse inherent
in the contracting of the marriage Therefore, Petitioner's request for an annulment is denied.
3

That during the course of the marriage various irreconcilable differences arose

between the parties herein making it impossible for Petitioner to continue this mamage, and
Petitioner is entitled to a Decree of Divorce severing the bonds of matrimony between the parties
herein.
5.

That no minor children have been born as issue of this mamage

6.

That both parties are currently employed and capable of supporting themselves and

therefore neither party should be awarded alimony and the same should be waived.

2
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7

That the Petitioner owned a home and residence prior to the marriage located at 786

River Glen Drive m Murray, Utah, and the Respondent owned a condominium which he acquired
prior to the marriage located at 416 East Creekside # B in Murray, Utah
8 The court finds that Petitioner purchased her home in 1998 with a boyfriend In 1998
she took out a second mortgage for $20,000 00 to cash out the boyfriend She paid $8,000 00 to
the boyfriend for his down payment and for any equity accumulated against the balance for
debts In April of 2003, Respondent moved into the property and paid her $563 00 which was
approximately half of the house payment At that time his name was not on the property The
Pantes got married over a year later m May 2004 and then m August 2004 Respondent's name
was added to the title of the property (Exhibit C) There is testimony that there was conversation
between the parties that not only Mr Romero's name be added to the home but that Mrs
Romero's name would be added to the condo that Mr Romero had purchased prior to the
marriage
9 As it relates to the condo the court finds that the property was purchased from
Respondent's nephew in 2003 for approx $85,000 00 , and the court finds that at the time of the
mamage in 2004 there was no equity in either the home originally purchased by Mrs Romero or
the condo originally purchased by Mr Romero
10 In May 2006, a second mortgage was placed on Petitioner's home in the amount
of $31,000 00 and it replaced the prior $20,000 second mortgage Most of that equity was used
to pay off Mrs Romero's debts

3

000

11 In January 2007 the parties separated and the court finds that the fair market value
of the properties should be valued at that time for the reason that Mr Romero quit making
payments on the Petitioner's home after he left in January of 2007 Both parties paid their own
mortgage payments after that date The Court finds that the fair market value of the Petitioner's
home as of the date of separation was $235,000

The Court finds that the fair market value of

the condo or Respondent's home at the date of separation was $122,000 The debt owing on the
Petitioner's home based on exhibits presented was about $168,000, $31,000 on the second
mortgage and $137,000 on the first mortgage The testimony as to the debt on the condo or
Respondent's home indicated it was about $76,000
12 The court has to make a determination based upon the case law cited as to the
identity of the property m dispute to determine whether each item is martial or separate property
The court finds that nothing was done as it relates to the condo to make it a martial asset It was
kept in Mr Romero's sole name, he was the only one who made any payments upon it, and he
took all control and management over it The Court finds that the home originally was a separate
asset of Mrs Romero, but then became a marital asset for a number of reasons First of which
was that Mr Romero's name was placed on the property, he made a number of repairs and
improvements to the property and he made half of the mortgage payment for that property and it
was never considered by him as a rental payment
13 The court next must consider whether there are exceptional circumstances that
would warrant the Court deviating from the general presumption that martial property be divided

4
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equally between the parties. The Court finds that there are exceptional circumstances as
follows:
A. It was the clear intent from the testimony of both Mrs. Romero and Mr.
Romero that both properties would be put in both names and had that been done then there would
have been a claim of title based upon the deeds to each property.
B. Furthermore, the Court finds it inherently unfair that Mr. Romero can receive
$650 per month rent from his condo and put it in his separate bank account. What he did is he
took the rent on the condo and put it in his own account so he obtained all the equity in that
property and had a third party basically pay his mortgage payment to Mrs. Romero for her home..
Certainly Mrs. Romero could have done the same thing if they would have moved into the condo.
That would not have been fair to Mr. Romero if the home was leased to someone that Mrs.
Romero knew or a tenant off the street and she kept all that money.
14. It seems to the Court that this a fairly novel case because both parties came into this
marriage, which was rather short in duration, with an asset with no equity. The values of the
properties according to the court calculations are $67,000 equity in the home as of the date of
separation, and $46,000 equity in the condo. That's approximately $20,000 which is not that
much difference. Therefore, the Petitioner shall be awarded all rights, title and interest in her
home located at 786 River Glen Drive in Murray, Utah and the Respondent shall be awarded all
rights, title and interest in his condo located at 416 East Creekside #B in Murray, Utah, each free
and clear of any interest, claim or equity of the other party except as stated herein. Further, both

5
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parties shall sign and execute any and all deeds or documents necessary to transfer title as stated
above or to obtain refinancing as required herein.
15. The Court finds however that there should be reimbursement for some of the
repairs and improvements made on the property, and some there should not be. The picture
window was installed for $500 but I think that is offset by the fact there is $1200 needed to repair
the walls as a result of the picture window being placed in the home improperly. The stepping
stones in the yard are minimal as are painting three walls in the garage and putting in the sink and
kitchen faucets in the kitchen and the bathroom. They were purchased for minimal amounts as
were the wire shelves for $15-20 dollars. However, the patio roof is somewhat different, and the
Court finds this is an improvement to the home and not just a minor repair. It is reasonable to
order that there be a reimbursement from Mrs. Romero to Mr. Romero for the patio roof, but the
Court doesn't have sufficient evidence to determine that amount. Counsel for both parties shall,
look at the documentation, share their documentation and if they cannot agree you the parties can
come back and present evidence on the issue, but the court's ruling is whatever Mr. Romero paid
for the patio cover will be reimbursed because that is an improvement to the home. If the parties
cannot agree on the value and the issue is brought back then the Court is willing to assess
attorney's fees to the party who loses.
16. The Court finds that the landscaping work was of little value, but any tools
purchased by Mr. Romero should be returned to him for reuse in landscaping. The same thing
with the fans in the bedroom and in the garage, those are also minimal expenses. The nephew

6
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put them in. The painting, and furnace repair goes along with the home. Further repairing any
leaks, railings, and the shelving are not substantial enough to give an offset.
17. It is reasonable that Mrs. Romero refinance the second mortgage within 90 days
and that Mr. Romero's name be taken off the second mortgage so his credit is not affected in any
manner.
18. It is reasonable that if Mr. Romero elects to do so he can take back the shed that
he purchased to put his stuff on the property. If he doesn't take it off in the next 30 days, then he
will have waived any right to take over the shed.
19. Next issue is the $650 that was allegedly taken by Mrs. Romero to pay the
January 2007 mortgage payment and the $200 of which was apparently returned. The Court does
not find that either party has met their burden with respect to that, the testimony is conflicting.
Mr. Romero testify that he paid the January payment of about $500 and Mrs. Romero said he did
not. The Court cannot determine from the evidence who's correct and who isn't.
8.

That during the marriage the parties acquired certain items of personal property

and it is reasonable that each party be awarded all of the items of personal property that were in
their possession at the time of the separation of the parties, which was the 20th of January, 2007.
Further it is reasonable that each party be awarded all those items of personal property in their
name only including but no limited to checking accounts, savings accounts, stocks, bonds and
other assets.

7
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9.

During the marriage the parties acquired an interest in retirement benefits and

accounts and it is reasonable that each party be awarded their own retirement benefits and
accounts including but not limited to 401K's, IRS's and pensions.
10.

It is reasonable that each party assume and pay those debts and obligations

incurred by that party prior to the marriage, and that each party assume and pay any and all debts
and obligations incurred by the party in their own name during the marriage.
11.

It is reasonable that each party be awarded all their premarital assets.

12.

It is reasonable that the Petitioner be restored her maiden name of Maestas.

13.

It is reasonable that each party pay their own attorney's fees and costs incurred in

this matter based upon the Court's finding that the parties earn approximately the same amount
of income and neither has a financial need where they cannot pay their own attorney's fees.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now enters it's Conclusions of
Law.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Petitioner is entitled to a Decree of Divorce severing the bonds of matrimony
between the parties herein the same to become final upon signing and filing with the court.
2. The Decree of Divorce shall be consistent with the terms and provisions as stated
herein above.

DATED this

day of March, 2009.
BY THE COURT

Honorable Terry Christiansen, District Court Judge
Approved as to form

Patricia LaTulippe, Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings to the following, postage
prepaid, this JS day of March 2009.
Patricia LaTulippe
Attorney at Law
5217 South State Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

ALICE M. ROMERO
Petitioner,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.
MANUEL ROMERO,
Respondent.

Case No.074400280
Judge : TERRY CHRISTIANSEN

The trial in the above matter came on before the Court on the 23rd of January 2009 before
the Honorable Terry Christiansen, Petitioner being present and represented by Richard S.
Nemelka and Respondent being present and represented by Patricia LaTulippe and witness
having been sworn and testified and exhibits having been admitted and the court having reviewed
the same and the parties having previously stipulated to the resolution of all but four issues and
the Court having entered it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing
therefore,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS

1 The Petitioner is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce severing the bonds of
matnmony between the parties herein, with the same to be final upon entry
2 The Petitioner shall be awarded all rights, title and interest in her home located at 786
River Glen Drive in Murray, Utah and the Respondent shall be awarded all rights, title and
interest in his condo located at 416 East Creekside #B in Murray, Utah, each free and clear of any
interest, claim or equity of the other party except as stated herein Further, both parties shall sign
and execute any and all deeds or documents necessary to transfer title as stated above or to obtain
refinancing as required herein
3 It is hereby ordered that there be a reimbursement from Mrs Romero to Mr Romero
for the patio roof, but the Court doesn't have sufficient evidence to determine that amount
Counsel for both parties shall, look at the documentation, share their documentation and if they
cannot agree you the parties can come back and present evidence on the issue, but the court's
ruling is whatever Mr Romero paid for the patio cover will be reimbursed because that is an
improvement to the home Lf the parties cannot agree on the value and the issue is brought back
then the Court is willing to assess attorney's fees to the party who loses
4 Any tools purchased by Mr Romero should be returned to him for reuse in
landscaping
5 Mrs Romero shall refinance the second mortgage within 90 days and Mr Romero's
name shall be taken off the second mortgage so his credit is not affected in any manner
2
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6. Mr. Romero may elect to take back the shed that he purchased to put his stuff on the
property. If he doesn't take it off in the next 30 days, then he will have waived any right to take
over the shed.
8. Each party is awarded all of the items of personal property that were in their
possession at the time of the separation of the parties, which was the 20th of January, 2007.
Further, each party is awarded all those items of personal property in their name only including
but no limited to checking accounts, savings accounts, stocks, bonds and other assets.
9. Each party is awarded their own retirement benefits and accounts including but not
limited to 401K's, ERS's and pensions.
10. Each party shall assume and pay those debts and obligations incurred by that party
prior to the marriage, and that each party shall assume and pay any and all debts and obligations
incurred by the party in their own name during the marriage.
11. Each party be awarded all their premarital assets.
12. The Petitioner is restored her maiden name of Maestas.
13.

Each party pay their own attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter.

DATED this 2*f

Approved as to form

Patricia LaTulippe

day of March, 2009.

BY THE COURT

p

Honorable Terry Christiansen, District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Decree to the following, postage
prepaid, this 3 day of March 2009.
Patricia LaTulippe
Attorney at Law
5217 South State Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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